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Abstract: 
 
The period of globalisation has seen more and more of international and regional 
organisation. Setting up an organisation with a group of state entails a resolution to the 
following two questions: (1) How are votes to be allocated? (2) What aggregatio n rule is to be 
employed? International and regional organisations display some interesting differences in 
how they have approached these two questions choosing a regime. The power index 
framework offers a convenient method for analysing these constitutional differences. It may 
be linked with the basic framework in constitutional economics – Wicksell’s classic approach, 
which entails that players very much use their preferences for the power to act and the power 
to prevent action when deciding the regime to be employed. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Global governance can take place through international organisations covering 
most of the countries of the world or through regional organisations covering a 
continent like Europe, South East Asia and Latin America. International and 
regional organisations display a multiplicity of objectives and organisational 
structures. One common element in all the organisational variety that 
international and regional organisations display is power, meaning how 
decisions are made and who can influence these. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to identify a few principles guiding the distribution 
of voting power within international and regional organisations. These groups of 
states are looked upon as playing n-person games and the power index scores 
offer the general solution to such games. The power index method has become 
highly popular in recent years, as it allows for the derivation of unique solution 
numbers to highly complex games with several players having different voting 
weights. Here the emphasis is upon the interpretation of the basic parameters 
that the power index method calculates, and not the calculations themselves.  
 
The players in international and regional organisations are the states of the 
world, represented by their governments. They have to decide on how much 
power they wish to hand over to these organisations. And international and 
regional organisations in turn have to reflect upon how its power is to be 
distributed onto its member states. The first perspective upon power – from 
member states to the organisation (von unten – oben) refers to the capacity of the 
group to take decisions: group decisiveness. The second perspective upon power 
– from the organisation to the member states (von oben – unten) – refers to how 
power is allocated onto member states and whether they have different power 
weights: the individual capacity to enact and to block decisions. 
 
 
THE STARTING POINT: Revising Wicksell’s Theory  
 
In rational choice the key principle for analysing group decision-making is the 
Wicksell principle of unanimity. Swedish economist Knut Wicksell argued early 
that unanimity is the best decision rule for a group of players when coordinating 
their actions towards a common goal, or set of goals. Wicksell claimed that 
unanimity is the “just” rule of aggregating individual preferences to a social 
choice. The Wicksell idea that unanimity is – so to speak – the normal decision 
rule for a group was employed as one basic principle in the public choice 
approach, especially constitutional economics (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; 
Buchanan, 1989). Thus, international and regional organisations would endorse 
unanimity, if special circumstances do not force them to choose otherwise. 
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However, the veto principle is not endorsed in all of these organisations, as a 
matter of fact. Is this accidental? 
 
Wicksell suggested somewhat ad hoc that transaction costs play a role at the 
constitutional stage when decision rules are framed, referring to opportunistic 
strategies of the last coalition members to say YES. Obviously, the concept of 
transaction costs were not known at the time of Wicksell (1896), but it has later 
on been formalised into a general theory of costs linked with decisions rules – 
see the literature on the distinction between internal and external decision costs 
(Wicksell, 1967). In constitutional economics, one still maintains the idea that 
unanimity is the most fundamental decision rule, because it connects well with 
the notion of Pareto optimality. One may actually argue that Pareto optimality in 
economics is the same as the veto principle in a democracy.  
 
Yet, only the UN Security Council employs the veto principle, although in a 
limited version where only the five permanent members can exercise a veto. 
And among the regional organisations one observes that the EU has abandoned 
the Luxembourg comprise and moved towards an endorsement of qualified 
majority (QM). I will to argue that voting is necessary in groups larger than 10-
15 players. What is wrong with the unanimity principle is that it makes voting 
superfluous. And this is in reality not the case. Voting is a rational method for 
deciding how to aggregate individual preferences into one social outcome. It 
matters both directly and indirectly.  
 
It is often claimed that the Council of the European Union does not vote 
explicitly but merely confirms with a unanimous decision what has been 
negotiated among the member states. Thus, bargaining is the key technique for 
deciding common matters, and not voting. However, this standpoint confuses 
explicit voting with implicit voting or direct with indirect voting. Bargaining is 
done on the basis of the voting scheme handed down in the various treaties. 
Thus, Germany has more bargaining power than e.g. Sweden or Lithuania, and it 
may always demand a vote to show what the basic regime facts are. Thus, 
something is wrong with the classical Wicksell approach, stating that veto is the 
key rule in group decision-making.  
 
Yet, the veto principle may receive backing from outside of economics. Thus, if 
states were looked upon as sovereign actors, then it would be logical to suggest 
that the veto principle must be the most fundamental decision rule. States bind 
themselves in international and regional organisations. However, this position 
bypasses that states would enter supra national organisations in order to get 
things done, not only to block matters they do not like. Thus, states would also 
care for the group capacity to act, which is not high with the unanimity rule. A 
state would not become member of an international or regional organisation 
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only to insist upon the veto, because if one state gets the veto, then all the others 
must also be provided with the same powers, except in an exceptional 
organisation like the Security Council. The ideal situation for a state – veto for 
itself and simple majority status for all the others – does not exist in any 
international or regional organisation. Now, why create multi-lateral 
coordination mechanisms in the first place? 
 
States may regulate their common matters either bilaterally or multilaterally. 
Globalisation has resulted in more and more of international and regional 
organisation. A variety of motives push governments to enter the states they 
represent into international organisations and regional groups of states. States 
may decide to coordinate their actions from political (peace) economic (trade 
and affluence) or environmental reasons (externalities, resource depletion). 
Thus, they set up groups of states with some form of common organisation and 
the definition of a set of rules. Culture may also play a role as with the Arab 
League or the Muslim Conference.  
 
The Wicksell theory about group decision-making entails that the members 
would prefer for rational reasons or out of considerations for justice that the 
group employs the unanimity decision rule. Under unanimity it does not matter 
whether the choice participants have one vote or dispose of several votes. The 
ensuing behaviour is veto based. But why would states set of coordination 
mechanisms only with a view to be able to say NO? 
 
The preference given to the unanimity regime in constitutional economic and the 
public choice school is not shared among most political scientists, focussing 
upon effectiveness and the risk of deadlock. However, recently a theory has 
been suggested, which in a similar spirit gives precedence for unanimity, namely 
the veto player hypothesis (Tsebelis, 2002). He defined a “veto player” in the 
following way: 
 
   In order to change policy – or. as we will say henceforth, to change the  
  (legislative) status quo – a certain number of individual or collective 
  actors have to agree to the proposed change. (Tsebelis, 2002:2). 
 
This amounts to a too broad definition of a choice participant with veto. The 
concept of the veto should be linked with one regime: unanimity. When Tsebelis 
speaks about so-called veto players: 
 
     Veto players are specified in the constitution of a country (the president, the  
     House, and the Senate in the United States) or by the political system (the  
     different parties that are members of a government coalition in  
     Western Europe) (Tsebelis, 2002: 2) 
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then he is actually referring to power or influence in general. In the analysis of 
international and regional organisation, it is vital to maintain the legal concept of 
the veto, meaning an unconditional capacity to block a group decision by merely 
casting a vote NO. Power or policy influence can be exercised without 
unanimity, as will be shown below. 
 
When states enter international or regional organisations, then their governments 
will be motivated by a variety of interests or preferences. The key principle of 
state sovereignty would guide them towards a priority for unanimity, but they 
know that this implies the recognition of vote for all players. If states want 
decisive international or regional organisations, then they may be hesitant about 
unanimity and in stead try to maximise voting power. Let me explain what all 
this entails. I will launch a theory of group decision-making below which 
challenges the Wicksell preference for unanimity by suggesting instead that it is 
the maximisation of voting power that is the normal motivation with unanimity 
as a special case. 
 
 
THE VOTING POWER APPROACH: The Calculus 
 
Much work has been devoted towards the elaboration of a contradiction free 
calculus of voting power (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998, 2004; Leech, 
2002,a,b,c,d). It has given certain key parameters, which will be introduced 
below in an informal fashion (Lane and Maeland, 2000). After the key 
parameters b, d, q and h have been introduced, I will raise the contested issue of 
the interpretation of these parameters. 
 
Given a set of players, N = }{ n,...,1 , formal decision-making in a group can be 
modelled as a simple game, (a voting game ), where subsets, S NÍ , of players 
form winning coalitions (or so-called win sets). These winning coalitions are 
assigned the total value of the game, normalised to one, while the losing 
coalitions get nothing. The gain in a simple game is given by a characteristic 
function v : 2N ® }{ 1,0 ,  
 
î
í
ì
=
,0
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)(
otherwise
winningisif
sv  
 
 
with u(? ) = 0 and ( )Nu = 1. The characteristic function combined with the set 
of players, the pair ( ),N u , will then be a proper definition of a simple game. 
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A general form of simple games is the weighted majority game which is the 
basic model used to study power distributions among players (voters) when 
individual amounts of votes may differ. A player i e N thus casts wi votes, while 
a decision rule c  decides the quota of votes needed to pass a bill. In other words, 
in a weighted majority game (c, w) = [c; w1 ……wn], the characteristic function 
has the form: 
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Simple games have no equilibrium, as no coalition can prevail against all the 
others. Thus, the search for a one equilibrium solution to the simple game is an 
abortive effort. Simple games have empty cores when simple majority is 
employed, but when unanimity is used then the core is extremely large. Yet, a 
plausible solution concept to simple games is offered by the power index. A 
power index measures several aspects of voting power such as group 
decisiveness d as well as the individual capability of a player (voter) to be 
decisive in a voting session, making so-called swings h or using his/her 
blocking power q. It is an a priori measure that summarises the results of all 
possible rounds of play of a game, that is, the index considers all 2N possible 
coalitions, which are checked for win sets and decisive players.  
 
There are actually two ways of calculating power index scores: the Shapley-
Shubik and the Penrose-Banzhaf indices. I will concentrate here upon the 
Penrose -Banzhaf index, as it models the voting procedure as involving the 
casting of both YES and NO votes. It is based upon the entire set of all equally 
probable coalitions, derived from the characteristic function of the game. The 
coalitions considered by the Penrose-Banhzaf index may include several 
decisive players making the index an absolute power measure, which only in 
exceptional cases sum to one. 
 
A formal presentation of the Penrose-Banzhaf index is obtained by considering 
the power set 2N of all possible and by assumption equally likely coalitions S Í  
N, the empty set { }Ø included. From these 2n coalitions the Banzhaf score of 
the player i is the number of coalitions in which i is critical, that is, the number 
of coalitions that player i is able to swing. There are two types of swings h, on 
the one hand type (a) swings where player i turns a winning coalition into losing 
by leaving it, and, on the other hand, type (b) swings where player I turns a 
losing coalition into winning by joining it. Given the set of winning coalitions 
 
 8 
),( uNW  = }{ 1)( =Í SNS u , 
 
the type (a) and type (b) swings are represented by (S ),( uNWÎ , S \ 
}{ ),( uNWi Ï ) respectively ),(( uNWS Ï , ),(}{ uNWiS ÎÈ ) . However, 
because of symmetry, the number of the two types of swings will be equal and 
one may thus focus upon the count of type (a) swings.  Now, assume equally 
likely coalitions NS Í  then the Banzhaf power index of player i - b - is 
defined by the ratio: 
 
ib  = 12 -n
ih , 
 
Using the commonly used characteristic function form, one gets: 
 
ib  = 12 -n
ih å
Î
Í
-
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An interesting implication is that the sum of the individual Banzhaf indices 
diminishes with increasing decision rule, c. Moving from simple majority rule 
via qualified majority rules to the strictest unanimity rule has a substantial 
negative effect on this sum. A unanimity game, UN, has only one winning 
coalition, the grand coalition N, which all players are able to swing, that is, h i 
equals one for all i. Note, the counterpart type (b) swing, player i is able to turn a 
losing coalition N \ }{i into winning by joining. Thus, the (minimised) unanimity 
Banzhaf index simplifies to: 
 
ib  | NU  = 12
1
-n . 
 
The individual unanimity power will be small for even a modest number of 
players. A question one may now ask is if it is possible to find some general 
(collective) effect that the decision rule has on the Banzhaf index. We want a 
number that, given a certain decision rule, c, measures the capability of an 
assembly to form winning coalitions. A simple indicator of this capability is just 
a simple count of the winning coalitions of a game, d = W(N, v) , which is 
obtained by: 
 
d = å
Í NS
S)(u  
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Relating this number to the total number of possible coalitions of a game we 
obtain the probability of decisiveness of a game, 
 
n
d
2
=d . 
 
With no restrictions on c, absolute decisiveness, d = 1, is obtained by the 
improper game of a zero decision rule. In this uninteresting case all proposals 
will be automatically accepted. The class of improper games are simple games 
where at least two sets may simultaneously form winning coalitions thus 
implying a decision rule less than ½. A decisive game, on the other hand, can 
only have one winning coalition at the time. In this class of games, d  has a 
maximum value of ½ as with the simple majority decision rule. Not surprisingly, 
a minimum level of decisiveness obtains with the unanimity decision rule. With 
only one winning coalition minimum d  is equal to 1/2n, and, as the number of 
player increases, the probability of decisiveness is reduced quickly with the 
increase in the number of players: 
 
d{lim
¥®n
 | }NU = 0 
 
The apparently high relative power connected with unanimity decision rule 
actually leaves players quite powerless when the probability of decisiveness is 
considered.  
 
The number of individual swings, h I, is a crucial factor in this index and relating 
this number with the total number of winning coalitions, d, we obtain what we 
define as the individual probability of blocking q:  
 
d
i
i
h
q =  
 
The Penrose-Banzhaf index can be factorised into the product of the probability 
of decisiveness, d , and twice the individual probability of blocking, q I: 
 
ii dqb 2=  
 
The doubling of the individual probability of blocking reflects that the Banzhaf 
index is based on the two symmetric swings in a game, YES or NO. A slightly 
different interpretation is given by the dual game approach to the type (b) 
swings, where a dual to the probability of decisiveness is interpreted as a 
collective probability to block, d *, where d* then denotes the total number 
blocking coalitions. The dual to the individual probability of blocking will then 
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become an individual probability to break a blocking coalition, q I*. Hence, the 
Penrose -Banzhaf index becomes the sum of these two products 
 
**+= iii qddqb  
 
The voting power of a player i, thus, equals twice the product of the probability 
of decisiveness, d , and the individual probability of blocking q I.  The calculus in 
the Shapley-Shubik index is conceived in an alternative manner. The Banzhaf 
index gives: a) the voters’ probability of being decisive assuming that all 
possible outcomes have the same probability; b) the voters’ probability of being 
decisive given that the voter is sure to vote YES assuming that all possible 
outcomes have the same probability; c) the voters’ probability of being decisive 
given that the voter is sure to vote NO assuming that all possible outcomes have 
the same probability. The Shapley-Shubik index gives: a’) the voters’ 
probability of being decisive assuming that all possible outcomes have NOT the 
same probability. It is assumed that the probability that a voter votes YES is the 
same that the probability that two voters vote YES. For small groups the two 
calculi give almost identical numbers, but for large groups with unequal players 
the numbers can deviate substantially. Below I will use the Penrose-Banzhaf 
framework. But how are the numbers to be interpreted? Of which world are they 
true? 
 
 
THE POWER INDEX APPROACH: Alternative Interpretations 
 
A heated debate has raged in scientific journals during the last decade about the 
applicability of the voting power approach. It has been argued that there is a 
fundamental problem in relation to the calculus of voting power, as it is not clear 
what the derived numbers stand for. One of the key assumptions behind the 
framework – the axiom of equal probability of all possible coalitions – is what 
the attack on this solution concept for N-person games targets. 
 
One may conceive of the following alternative interpretations of the key 
parameters in the voting power framework (b,d, h, q). They represent: 
 
1) relative frequencies in a very long run of plays – an empirical 
interpretation 
2) capacities or potentialities – the constitutional interpretation 
 
The first interpretation is called a posteriori  voting power and may be estimated 
through an analysis of actual coalition behaviour. However, in reality all games 
are finite and thus not all coalitions will form, as the preferences of the players 
rule out certain coalitions or make them little probable. The second 
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interpretation is called a priori voting power and it deals with a constitutional 
world where players project their future capacities to prevail under alternative 
regimes.  
 
I believe that the a priori interpretation is the only tenable one. Against it has 
been claimed that it makes players act under a veil of ignorance, voting in 
coalitions without any preferences. This is not correct, because under a 
constitutional interpretation the players would wish to know their general 
capacity to prevail whatever the issues involved may be. The preferences of the 
players will change from one issue to another, and so will the coalitions. It 
would be incorrect to exclude certain coalitions at the constitutional stage, as 
opportunistic strategies and logrolling make the most unlikely coalitions 
possible.  
 
It is at the constitutional stage that the players will display their preferences 
when choosing between alternative regimes. If the players are afraid of ending 
up in more loosing coalitions than winning ones, or if they fear the losses more 
than they value the gains, then they will opt for qualified majority or unanimity 
schemes. At the constitutional stage the players also have to come to an 
understanding of the weights that are to be allocated to them. Either one 
employs qualitative or quantitative voting. The choice of a regime governing 
decision-making in a group is intimately linked with the preferences of the 
players involved.  
 
Thus, it is completely erroneous to claim that the power index does not take the 
preferences of the players into account. On the contrary, when setting up a 
regime, the various players in a group have determinate preferences for what to 
do with the status quo (SQ). If they favour no changes or small changes to the 
SQ, then they will opt for unanimity, whereas if they wish to change the SQ, 
then they will favour simple majority. If there are considerable differences 
between the players in terms of some relevant characteristics, then they will 
have strong preferences for some quantitative voting scheme. It is all based upon 
their preferences for minimising the decision costs of possibly loosing over the 
prospects of being able to change the SQ. 
 
 
THE DIVERSITY OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS  
 
There are so many regimes in operation for a variety of international and 
regional organisations. The voting power framework offers a convenient method 
for stating their similarities and differences. Thus, the key parameters in the 
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voting power approach will be determined by alternative ways of framing the 
following two rules: 
 
1) The number of votes cast by a player. Here there is huge variation from one 
player - one vote (qualitative voting) to immense differences in votes 
(quantitative voting). 
 
2) The decision rule employed for aggregating votes into a group decision: 
simple majority, various forms of qualified majority and unanimity.  
 
In order to state the differences between all conceivable regimes for 
international and regional organisations in a systematic fashion – the 
participating players would certainly wish to be able to do so at the 
constitutional stage, one can only employ the power index approach. It offers a 
technique for calculating the power implications of alternative regimes, existing 
ones as well as reforms suggested. 
 
Regimes can be compared systematically in terms of the parameters of the 
power index calculus. The following aspects of voting power are relevant for 
constitutional deliberations and choice: 
 
1) d = The decisiveness of the group, which is the same efficiency; 
2) bi = the absolute power of a player i;  
3)qi = the power of a player to block. 
 
Values for each of these parameters are derivable for each regime from the 
power index framework. One may regard these numbers as constituting values 
on a ratio scale meaning that one may calculate the differences in group 
decisiveness, absolute power and blocking power between alternative regimes in 
terms of percentages. 
 
Voting power has one collective aspect – group decisiveness, which is shared by 
all. In addition, voting power has two individual components, namely the power 
to act and the power to block. Generally, it holds that group decisiveness is 
inversely related to the power of any player to block. Moreover, it also holds 
that the capacity of a player to act is positively related to both group 
decisiveness and the absolute power of a player. Thus, I will concentrate upon 
the following three parameters: 
 
a) Group decisiveness, 
b) Blocking power, 
c) Absolute voting power. 
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As emphasized, group decisiveness and blocking power are inversely related 
and the simple majority regime maximises the absolute voting power of a 
player. Blocking power and absolute power will differ substantially from one 
player to another when they have different voting weights. I will pay special 
attention to these differences under quantitative voting. Now, which are the 
main types of regimes? Without any claim to comprehensiveness I wish to 
differentiate between the following types: 
 
- Simple Majoritarian Constitution : One state – One vote, Simple Majority. No 
international or regional organisation employs this dispensation fully. One could 
mention the EU Council as concerns procedural matters, but they are not really 
the essence of EU decision-making. A telling example of this dispensation is the 
EU Parliament, where however the players organise themselves in party 
families, which sometimes vote as one player – quantitative voting in real 
although not formal terms. One could also mention the ECB. 
-  
Qualified Majoritarian Constitution: One state – One Vote, but 2/3rds or 3/4ths 
majority. The WTO is one example of this dispensation; the EU under the final 
Dublin constitution is another example. One may also mention the International 
Whaling Commission and the ILO as examples as well as the WHO. 
 
Qualified Majority Constitutions, Quantitative Voting: One state – several votes, 
2/3rds or 3/4ths majority. Here there are numerous examples in the period of 
globalisation: the IMF, the WB, and the EU Council under the Nice Treaty. 
 
Unanimity Constitution: veto for several or all players. Here the most telling 
example is the UN Security Council, but all the regional coordination 
mechanisms except the EU employ unanimity such as the ASEAN, 
MERCOSUR and ECOWAS. 
 
One may calculate the power index scores for these alternative regimes. Table 1 
presents an overview of the key parameters of voting power with regard to some 
of the main international and regional organisations today. 
 
 
Table 1. International and Regional Organisations: Voting Power Parameters 
 
                             d             b                 q 
 
UN Security Council        0.026 
a) Perm members                       0.052              1.0 
b) Non-Perm members                   0.005            0.099 
UN Reformed Council*       0.021 
a)     Perm members                      0.042              1.0 
b)    Non-Perm members                   0.005            0.123 
The IMF                    0.053 
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a) US                                    0.106            0.989 
b) UK                                    0.050            0.467 
c) Eqa Guinea                            0.014            0.135 
The WTO                  0.000021     0.000015             0.35 
The ILO                 0.0000065    0.0000045             0.34 
The IWC                   0.00024      0.00025             0.52 
EU COUNCIL(Nice)            0.036                    
a) Germany                            0.157            0.780 
b) Sweden                             0.048            0.238 
c) Luxemburg                          0.037            0.185 
EU COUNCIL (Dublin 2004)   0.109 
a) Germany                            0.158            0.725 
b) Sweden                             0.039            0.181 
c) Luxemburg                          0.026            0.121 
The ECB                      0.5 
a) President                         0.371 
b) Exe Board                         0.175 
c) National Rep                      0.175 
The EU Parliament            0.5 
a) Germany                           0.422 
b) Malta                             0.019 
 
* According to the 24 members proposal. 
 
 
One observes first, when analysing the voting power parameter scores in Table 1 
that some of these organisations face a huge problem with a low efficiency: the 
UN Security Council, the WTO, the ILO and IWC. These organisations can only 
operate when there is a large consensus among the preferences of the players. 
They are likely to become blocked – paralysed institutions. Secondly, a few of 
these organisations have the opposite characteristic, namely a high degree of 
group decisiveness: the European Central Bank and the EU Parliament. Thirdly, 
some organisations achieve a certain level of decisiveness, which is not high but 
still inexistent, but this is only accomplished through quantitative voting. 
Finally, one finds in Table 1 evidence to the effect that an international or 
regional organisation may combine a certain level of power to act with a high 
degree of blocking power, thus avoiding the decision inertia trap.  
 
If one accepts the assumption that players in collective choice would wish to 
maximise their total voting power, then the pattern in Table 1 can only be 
understood by the fact that the players favour the power to block more than the 
power to act. Since absolute voting power is maximised under simple majority, 
the use of qualified majority in most international organisation as well as in the 
EU Council implies that member states have a preference for blocking power 
but that they realise the decision inertia in the unanimity regime. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
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The normative implication of these findings concerning the voting power 
implications of alternative regimes is that international and regional 
organisations should avoid regimes, which result in an extremely low 
decisiveness – the decision inertia trap. Moreover, international and regional 
regimes can be devised which combine a certain capacity to act with a high level 
of blocking power, if one is prepared to allow for the possibility of allocating 
widely different voting weights to the players. 
 
This would then be the road ahead, empowering international regional 
organisations through staying away from unanimity, but allowing for a 
distribution of votes, which takes into account the size of the member state, 
either in terms of population or in terms financial contribution to the 
organisation. Probably simple majority is too radical a mechanism for the design 
of international and regional organisations above the state level, but qualified 
majority will do well, especially when combined with quantitative voting. 
Governments setting up a regime will not have symmetric preferences between 
the power to act and the power to block, as they will favour the reduction of 
costs of potentially loosing. However, the players in a regional or international 
regime would also be interested in having some capacity to change the SQ. 
Thus, they have a strong preference for qualified majority regimes of some sort. 
 
Finally, one may wish to point out that quantitative voting may be done under 
almost any conceivable scheme that allocates votes differently. Thus, one would 
have great latitude in deliberating about alternative allocations. One would wish 
to relate the differences in votes to the differences in some square or cubic root 
expression of population differences: 
 
 
                  Votes (country 1)        Ö population (country 1) 
                  ---------------------    =   ----------------------------- 
                  Votes (country 2)        Ö population (country 2) 
 
Any root expression between the square and cubic root would be possible, 
depending upon how much vote differential one wants to have between the 
member states. Quantitative voting is essential in the governance of 
globalisation, especially when qualified majority is accepted to make changes of 
the SQ possible. 
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